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ABSTRACT 
When new technologies approach the market, companies usually look for ways to improve 
existing applications or simply to replace previous technologies. The management literature 
identifies several strategies for gaining value from technological discontinuities: improving 
performance, becoming the cost leader, being the first-mover, managing the complementary 
assets and influencing regulations and standards. Scholars identified several managerial 
practices and processes to leverage all these strategies. 
Recent literature suggests that there might be something more, namely, discovering new 
meanings, enabled by the technological discontinuity: a Technology Epiphany. This is still a 
young and largely unexplored research field, where, so far, no research has tried to 
understand what companies could do to actually develop such innovations. 
This paper aims at identifying a process companies could adopt to pursue a Technology 
Epiphany strategy. Employing a case study approach, we investigated the navigation apps 
industry, both turn-by-turn and marine, to understand how companies manage the 
technology discontinuity embedded in smartphones. Comparing several players in the two 
industries, we first demonstrate that the rise of a new market leader is not related to a 
traditional strategy but to a Technology Epiphany. Finally, we propose a 5-step process to 
pursue a Technology Epiphany strategy: i) Unveil opportunities hidden in the technology; ii) 
Translate the opportunity into a New Meaning; iii) Develop new features to reveal the New 
Meaning; iv) Adapt the business model; v) Adapt the development process to the new 
environment. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes companies fail in fully exploiting the opportunities provided by new technologies 
because they interpret them as means to replace previous technologies and improve already 
existing applications. As the semiologist Giampaolo Proni (2007) claims, “Technologies offer 
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opportunities which are of course not infinite, but are greater in number than those imagined 
by early developers”. Consequently, technological discontinuities can enable the development 
of completely different applications that address different needs in comparison to the 
previous generation. 
In this vein, the recent and still embryonic literature about Technology Epiphanies suggests 
interesting insights about a new possible innovation strategy to obtain value from 
technological discontinuities (Verganti, 2009; Dell’Era et al., 2010). This strategy is primarily 
based on finding New Meanings inside existing technologies, changing the "why" people buy 
specific products and services rather than changing the "how" these products fulfil customer 
needs. In the early '80s, the Swiss wristwatch companies who were world leaders experienced 
a serious impact by the competition based on quartz movements and digital displays produced 
by Japanese and Hong Kong manufacturers. Interestingly, Swiss manufacturers were among 
the first companies to investigate the quartz technology, but they considered it not fitting 
their core competences in precision mechanics and assembly. On the contrary, their 
competitors were able to "see" in these new technologies the opportunity to revolutionize 
the market. In those years, digital displays were employed to communicate data in laboratory 
measurement devices, to display numbers in calculators and to create imaginary interactive 
worlds in futuristic handheld game devices by Nintendo (e.g., Donkey Kong). Thanks to quartz 
technology, LCD displays could be utilized in wristwatches, and companies such as Casio and 
Seiko began to produce multifunctional wrist-watches embedding lights, stopwatches, alarms, 
countdowns, calculators and even videogames. Thanks to these products, wristwatches 
shifted from being iconic, expensive status symbols with which to measure time to being 
inexpensive, fun, multifunctional electronic gadgets that are also able to measure time. This 
transformation changed the meaning of wristwatches as well as the reason why people 
wanted to buy them. 
This exemplar case study demonstrates how companies often fail to consider new 
technologies as enablers for New Product Meanings. Technologies unveil numerous 
opportunities, particularly in the initial development stage. A multitude of these opportunities 
are indeed functional improvements of the already provided applications. Leveraging on 
knowledge created by R&D activities and market analyses, companies previously saw only 
these opportunities and eventually replaced the technologies they utilized with the new ones 
to improve the current performance. The few existing research studies about Technology 
Epiphanies highlight that the discovery of other potential applications enabled by 
technological discontinuities requires envisioning New Meanings based on completely new 
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performances and consequently, incomparable with the current applications. Going back to 
the previous example, Asian manufacturers did not interpret the quartz technology as a 
discontinuity enabling the improvement of the performance already provided by current 
watches (precision, lifetime, etc.), but as a discontinuity enabling the production of completely 
different applications and alternative performances (multi-functionality, flexibility, etc.). 
Obviously, Technology Epiphanies are not the only way to obtain value from technological 
discontinuities. Many other strategies have been investigated so far (e.g., performance 
leadership, cost leadership or first-moving advantages). Thanks to the work of many 
researchers, our current knowledge about these strategies is significant. Normally, after the 
seminal works of some researchers who identify and describe the strategy (e.g., Porter, 1985; 
Murray, 1988), many other researchers focus on identifying what managerial practices are 
required to pursue it (e.g., Von Hippel 1986; Treacy and Wiersema, 1997; Lüthje and Herstatt, 
2004). The interesting and pioneering literature about Technology Epiphanies is still in the first 
stage of this evolutionary path. It provides cases and examples useful to understand the 
phenomenon (e.g., Swatch, Nintendo Wii or iPod+iTunes) and describes the strategy 
companies could adopt to discover the quiescent meanings embedded in technological 
discontinuities (Verganti, 2009), but unfortunately, there is a lack of studies about how to 
pursue this innovation strategy. For this reason, the purpose of this paper is to identify a 
process companies could use to pursue a Technology Epiphany strategy. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we highlight the most relevant literature 
contributions regarding innovation strategies enabled by technology, in the third section, we 
introduce the methodological aspects and illustrate the case studies analysed, in the fourth 
and the fifth sections, the case studies are presented, while the cross-case comparison is 
explored in the sixth section. The seventh section discusses the main results highlighting the 
managerial implications, and finally, the eighth section concludes the paper, providing limits 
and further research directions. 
 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
In this section we firstly summarize the rich and consolidated literature streams about 
innovation strategies aimed at getting value from technological discontinuities; then we 
introduce the more recent literature stream about innovation of meanings where our 
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conceptual framework is positioned and finally we highlight the lack of studies about its actual 
implementation. 
 
2.1 Innovation strategies aimed at getting value from technological discontinuities 
Abetti (1989) defines technology as ‘a body of knowledge, tools and techniques, derived from 
both science and practical experience, which is used in the development, design, production 
and application of products, processes, systems and services’. The innovative potential 
embodied in each technology is widely accepted as a source of competitive advantage by 
academics, practitioners and governments. For this reason technological discontinuities are 
considered to be crucial game changer in terms of innovation. Scholars studied in depth 
technology cycles, defining technological discontinuity as the trigger periods of technological 
and competitive ferment that can change the innovation paths proposing a new dominant 
design (Tushman and Anderson, 1990). Firms can choose among several strategies aimed at 
getting value from technological discontinuities: performance leadership, cost leadership, 
first-mover strategy, complementary assets management, influence on regulations and 
standards. 
In 1985 Porter identified different strategies to rule the market, creating the preconditions for 
several other researches aimed to cope with the five forces (Hill, 1988; Murray, 1988; 
Gopalakrishna and Subramanian, 2001). To gain the performance leadership is a first strategy 
to capture value from a technological discontinuity. The firm aims at being unique in its own 
industry, identifying some dimensions, valuable for buyers, and working on them in order to 
make its own product the best one on the market. Differentiation enables a premium price 
above-average thanks to the improved performances. A technology discontinuity can bring to 
leading-edge products with improved performances in comparison to the applications 
enabled by the previous technology (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 1999; Cooper, 2005). Authors 
suggest several managerial practices to implement this strategy. Companies that want to 
follow this strategy should focus on the most updated technologies that lead to increase 
products performances or to carefully listen the market in order to identifying new valuable 
dimensions on which to compete. Technology intelligence literature suggests several methods 
to acquire and evaluate information on technological trends, such as roadmapping and 
experience curves (Porter et al., 1991; Martino, 1992; Kappel, 1998; Bucher, 2003). These 
recommended techniques are used not only for technology forecast but also to scout available 
technologies on the market, i.e. benchmarking studies (Ransley, 1996). Moreover several 
methods are proposed to listen to the users. Lead users analysis, for example, can be 
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considered in order to understand new dimensions of performance (Von Hippel, 1986; Urban 
and Von Hippel, 1988; Lüthje and Herstatt, 2004). Finally, performance leadership can be 
implemented considering not only the product, but also the related services: enlarging the 
attractiveness of products with services may lead to superior performance perception 
(Vandermerwe and Rada, 1989; Treacy and Wiersema, 1997; Baines et al, 2007). 
Porter (1985) identified a second strategy to rule the market: cost leadership. The 
technological discontinuity could lead a company to produce at the lowest cost within the 
industry. In this case, technologies impact on the production/delivery process enabling the 
cost reduction thanks to different drivers such as economies of scales, patents, preferential 
accesses etc. The product performances need to be considered as well: in order to make this 
strategy sustainable and gain above-average results buyers need to perceive the product 
comparable with the others. Treacy and Wiersema (1997) suggested that throughout 
operational excellence is possible to gain the best total cost and to reach an operational 
leadership, delivering the perfect match of quality, price and ease of purchase (e.g. 
McDonalds, Easy Jet) (McChrystal, 2014). Cost management techniques are developed in this 
vein (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). To reduce the cost of new products, managers can, for 
example, apply value engineering and target-costing approach (Monden, 1995; 
Seidenschwarz, 2003; Ibusuki and Kaminski, 2007). 
Studying the relationship between technological discontinuities and market success many 
researchers focused on the moment when a company approaches the market: first-mover 
strategy. This is crucial because it could be a way to beat competitors; several scholars wrote 
about the so-called first-mover advantage (e.g. Kalyanaram, Robinson and Urban, 1955; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). The first firm that approaches the market can enjoy 
several advantages. Brand loyalty (e.g. Neidrich and Swain, 2003) represents a reputation 
advantage, because the firm has the chance to create a trust relationship with customers 
when no others competitors are approaching them. The first mover effect can also lead to 
patents that create strong entry barriers (e.g. Brigh, 1949; Bresnahan, 1985), preemption of 
scarce assets, in term of strategic location (e.g. Prescott and Visscher, 1977, Schmalensee, 
1978; Rao and Rutenberg, 1979; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982), government concessions or 
exclusive access to input factors (e.g. Main, 1955). Moreover, if customers invest time and 
money in firm’s product, they are unwilling to change it. Costs to switch to another product 
may represent another first mover advantage (e.g. Porter, 1976, 1980; Schmalensee, 1981; 
Wernerfelt, 1985). Finally, according to Spence (1981), if the industry is characterized by 
increasing returns, two more drivers have to be considered: the learning curve (e.g. 
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Ghemawat, 1984; Shaw and Shaw, 1984) and the network externalities (facilitating a standard 
creation process). Several others scholars analyzed the timing effects (e.g. Robinson et al., 
1992; Kalyanaram et al., 1995; Lee et al., 2000), underling empirically how these advantages 
are highly industry-related (e.g. Huff, 1982; Frederickson, 1984; Judge & Miller, 1991; 
Vanderwerf & Mahon, 1997). In order to be the first mover, it’s necessary to reduce the time 
to market. A flexible approach, for example, can postpone the concept frozen of NPD projects 
(MacCormack et al, 2001; Buganza et al, 2010). Moreover standardizing interfaces between 
components in a product design can lead to an easy and quick introduction of the new 
technology in complex products leveraging on modularity and scalability (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Worren et al, 2002). 
Complementary assets management is another widely researched field to understand how to 
profit from technological discontinuities. Mitchell (1989; 1992) proposes different categories 
of complementary assets: generic assets have multiple applications and can be easily 
contracted, whereas specialized and co-specialized assets are useful only in the context of a 
given innovation. Teece (1986) adopts a similar classification and proposes four main 
typologies of complementary assets: (i) competitive manufacturing; (ii) distribution; (iii) 
service; and (iv) complementary technologies. According to the incumbent’s curse theory, 
innovations based on technological discontinuities are likely to be developed by new entrants 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986) because they can exploit the advantage, due to a lack of 
commitment to the old technological regime. At the same time, established firms can leverage 
critical complementary assets to capture maximum value from new technologies (Teece, 
1998; Tripsas 1997; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). While this effect can be minimal if a 
technological change diminishes the value of these assets (Tripsass, 1997), it can be argued 
that established firms should perform no worse than newer ones, as long as they recognize 
the possibility of obsolescence for these assets. From a practitioners viewpoint Rothaermel 
(2001b) describes how established firms can cooperate to exploit the value of their 
complementary assets by adopting network strategies that are not available to new entrants, 
leveraging on strategic alliances, also with new entrants (Rothaermel, 2001a). A number of 
recent studies take a stance against the assumption that incumbents are cursed, and identify 
situations in which established firms actually have significant advantages in turbulent 
environments. Different key attributes have been identified, such as cultivating dynamic 
capabilities, possessing visionary leaders, working on absorptive capacity and adopting 
platform-based technologies with positive externalities showing how companies can actually 
leverage on complementary assets (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; 
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Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Zahra and George, 2002; Iansiti et al, 2003; MacCormack and 
Iansiti, 2009; Buganza et al., 2009). 
One last research field investigated to understand the linkages between technological 
discontinuities and market success is how to influence on regulations and standards. Laws and 
regulations can be fundamental in the emergence of a new technology (Miller et al, 1995; 
Islas, 1999), even in a pre-market phase (Valentine-Urbschat and Bernhart, 2008), the firm 
could enjoy an important competitive advantage betting on the right features that the 
lawmaker or the regulator will control. At the same time the ability to influence the standard 
setting process, both de facto and de jure according to the literature classification (Farrell and 
Saloner, 1988, 1992; David and Greenstein, 1990; Besen and Farreell, 1994), can be extremely 
useful in order to extract value from a breakthrough technology, reaching a dominant position 
on the market. Scholars identified different organizational models that can lead to influence 
on regulations and standards. For example, organizing consortia help industries in the 
standards development process (Weiss and Cargill, 1992). These groups of company, sharing 
some special interests in a technological development, can create industry lobbies, able to 
influence policy makers and government choices (Grossman and Helpman, 1992; Damania 
and Fredriksson, 2000). Literature on company collaboration provides several examples of 
organizational models that can be used to follow this strategy (Chiesa and Manzini, 1998; 
Guan and Zhao, 2013). Moreover, standards can rise thanks to close collaboration with 
universities (Guan and Zhao, 2013). 
 
2.2 The role of innovation of meanings in getting value from technological discontinuities 
Performance leadership, cost leadership, first-mover strategy, complementary assets 
management and influence on regulations and standards are among the most recognized and 
studied strategies to profit from technological discontinuities. More recently another possible 
strategy arose. According to Verganti (2009) each technology embeds a set of disruptive new 
meanings that are waiting to be uncovered. If a company reveals those quiescent meanings, 
it will seize the technology’s full value, celebrating what Verganti (2009) calls a technology 
epiphany. In fact “Epiphany” etymologically means “a manifestation that stands in a superior 
position; a perception of the essential nature or meaning of something” (Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary). 
According to established theories of innovation management, design can act as a 
differentiator in mature industries (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Foster, 1986; Tushman 
and Anderson, 1990; 2004; Utterback, 1994; Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 
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1995): every industry is characterized by ‘technological discontinuities’ that, emerging at 
irregular time intervals, force companies to significantly innovate regarding their technological 
paradigms: ‘[these discontinuities] are based on new technologies whose technical limits are 
inherently greater than those of the previous dominant technology, along economically 
relevant dimensions of merit’ (Tushman and Anderson, 2004). More precisely, one or more 
radically new technologies break into an industry opening a ferment era; this stage allows 
leapfrog changes of functions and performance. In this stage, competitors struggle to find the 
most effective product architecture, and solve technological problems. When the technology 
has run its course, innovation becomes incremental, the product innovation speed decreases, 
and everyone waits for another technological discontinuity. At this stage, design starts playing 
a role as a differentiator during incremental innovations by making products different from 
competitors’ by leveraging on creativity, user interface and style. 
Recent literature about technology epiphanies (Verganti, 2009; Verganti, 2011a; Verganti, 
2011b; Norman and Verganti, 2014; Simoni et al., 2014) questions this ancillary role of design 
and shows how design can play a major role in a technology’s inception as well, particularly 
when a technology discontinuity arises. When a technology discontinuity emerges, it embeds 
many potential meanings. Some are immediate and promoted by those who have initially 
guided technological development. Other meanings are quiescent, but sooner or later they 
become manifest (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework: technology screening, substitution and epiphany 
(Verganti, 2009) 
 
Shortsighted companies often focus on searching new markets for a technology without 
taking into consideration the potential new meanings of the technology itself. In this way, 
when companies look for potential applications, they focus solely on technological 
substitutions. In these cases companies add more effective and powerful functionalities or 
improve performances, leaving the existing meaning untouched. This approach leads to two 
myopic behaviors. On the one hand, if the most immediate meaning of a new technology 
cannot support the meaning existing in the market, companies screen it off, considering it 
irrelevant. On the other hand, if the most immediate meaning of the new technology does fit 
the existing meaning, a company will invest by substituting the current technology with the 
new one. However, someone will eventually have a technology epiphany (Verganti, 2009). A 
technology epiphany may occur when a company has understood that a radical new meaning 
can emerge in the market and therefore is open to new technologies ― usually those that 
competitors have screened off. Alternatively, a technological epiphany may occur when a 
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company searches for the more-powerful meanings that a new technology embeds, as 
indicated by the horizontal arrow (see Figure 1). The same phenomena were also recognized 
by Tempelman et al. (2012) when they spoke of the need for ‘technology transformation’ i.e., 
the process of change that a technology undergoes when it gets ‘productized’ during product 
design. 
The Nintendo Wii represents an exemplar case study that allows to better understand the 
concept of technology epiphany. With the launch of the Sony PlayStation (1995), the 
PlayStation 2 (2000), and the Microsoft Xbox (2001), Nintendo lost its leadership and fell on 
hard times. Microsoft and Sony pushed even harder with their later consoles, the Xbox 360 
(May 2005) and the PlayStation 3 (November 2006). Both consoles were more powerful than 
their predecessors, offering high-definition images and more-complex games and graphics. 
Nintendo's positioning was very weak in comparison to Microsoft and Sony, its products 
seemed to be not able to compete in terms of complexity and performances. Probably for this 
reason Nintendo decided to play a completely different game. They developed the Wii, a 
radically new console characterized by having motion-sensitive controllers. These controllers 
leveraged a breakthrough technology: MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems) 
accelerometers, developed by STMicroelectronics. Surprisingly, Sony was already adopting 
the same technology in other product categories, and Microsoft was the first company to get 
in touch with a prototypical console developed by STMicroelectronics. Nevertheless they did 
not see how this technology could improve the high definition graphic and game complexity 
even more and screened the technology off. In the first two months after its release, the Wii 
sold 1 million units. In April 2007, six months after its release, the Wii’s sales in the U.S. market 
were twice those of the Xbox 360 and four times those of the PlayStation 3. What Nintendo 
did with Wii was not just to bring a new technology into the industry. Nintendo radically 
changed what a console game means to the user. Unlike the competitors, Wii games were 
simple in graphic, not 3D accelerated, easy to play and require short time for a match. They 
were typically multiplayers game but players were in the same room, interacting in the real 
world like in board games and not through the internet. More than being the technological 
evolution of previous consoles, the Nintendo Wii is the Monopoly® game of our century. 
 
As previously mentioned, the literature about consolidated strategies aimed at getting value 
from technological discontinuities not only provides clear indications about strategic 
approaches, but suggests also associated managerial practices (see Table 1). On the contrary 
technology epiphanies are still a largely unexplored research field. The phenomenon was 
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identified and described, but, to the best of our knowledge, no research tried so far to shed 
some light on how to actually develop such innovations. More precisely, the literature about 
technology epiphanies describes the strategy companies can adopt in order to discover the 
quiescent meanings embedded in technological discontinuities, but no research evidences 
have been collected about what concrete actions should be put in place in order to pursue 
this peculiar strategy (see Table 1). According to Alvesson and Sandberg (2013) this is a typical 
application gap in the current body of knowledge and this article aims at starting to bridge it. 
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Strategy References 
Practices to pursue the strategy 
(process, tool, etc.) 
References 
PERFORMANCE LEADERSHIP Porter, 1985; Murray, 1988 Technology intelligence methods: 
 Road-mapping Experience curves 
 Benchmarking studies 
 Lead users analysis 
 Products Services System integration/ 
Servitization 
Von Hippel, 1986; Urban and Von Hippel, 1988; 
Vandermerwe and Rada, 1989; Porter et al., 1991; 
Martino, 1992; Ransley, 1996; Treacy and 
Wiersema, 1997; Kappel, 1998; Bucher, 2003; 
Lüthje and Herstatt, 2004; Baines et al, 2007 
COST LEADERSHIP Porter, 1985 Cost management techniques:  
 Value engineering 
 Target-costing approach 
Monden, 1995; Treacy and Wiersema 1997; 
Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997; Seidenschwarz, 
2003; Ibusuki and Kaminski, 2007; McChrystal, 
2014 
FIRST-MOVER STRATEGY Kalyanaram, Robinson and Urban, 1955; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988 
 Patenting 
 Preemption of scarce assets 
 Switch costs and lock-in effects 
 Flexible process 
 Scalability and modularity 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; MacCormack et al, 2001; Worren et al., 
2002, Buganza et al., 2010 
COMPLEMENTARY ASSET MANAGEMENT Teece, 1986; Teece, 1998  Network strategies 
 Appropriation and absorptive capacity 
Cohen and Levinthal; 1990; Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000; Rothaermel, 2001a; Rothaermel, 2001b; 
Zahra, and Gerard, 2002; Rothaermel and Hill, 
2003; Iansiti et al, 2003; Buganza et al, 2009; 
MacCormack and Iansiti, 2009 
INFLUENCING REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS Farrell and Saloner, 1988, 1992; David and 
Greenstein, 1990; Besen and Farreell, 1994 
 Consortia 
 Lobbies 
 Collaboration with companies 
 Collaboration with universities 
Grossman and Helpman, 1992; Weiss and Cargill, 
1992; Chiesa and Manzini, 1998; Damania and 
Fredriksson, 2000; Guan and Zhao, 2013 
TECHNOLOGY EPIPHANY Verganti, 2009 Literature Gap 
Table 1: Strategic approaches and examples of related managerial practices 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Research methodology 
As previously mentioned the purpose of this paper is to identify a process companies could 
use to pursue a technology epiphany strategy. Due to lack of previous studies the research is 
exploratory in nature, hence we adopted a case study methodology approach, which allows 
to develop an holistic and contextualized analysis and to identify the critical variables of a 
phenomenon (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The case study analysis answers to “how” and 
“why” questions (Yin, 2003). Therefore, it fits our purpose to understand how company can 
actually implement a technology epiphany strategy. Our case studies have an exploratory 
intent, are retrospective and multiple in nature and, finally, rely on secondary resources (Yin, 
1984). 
 
3.2. Empirical setting 
The Smartphone Applications industry represents an intriguing empirical setting to explore 
this research objective, for several reasons. As stated by the report ‘The Mobile Consumer - A 
Global Snapshot’ developed by Nielsen in 2013, ‘when the first call was placed on a handheld 
mobile phone in 1973, the prototype device used was capable of less than 30 minutes of 
battery life and took 10 hours to re-charge. Fast-forward some 40 years later and mobile 
device ownership has reached critical mass around the world. Today, these devices serve as 
the primary communications and media vehicles for many and play an increasingly important 
role in the daily lives of consumers in both developed and high-growth economies’. According 
to the report ‘Big Data: The next frontier for innovation, competition and productivity’ 
developed by the McKinsey Global Institute in 2011, more than 5 billion mobile phones were 
in use in 2010, and this trend is still growing. By the end of 2013, global smartphone 
penetration had exploded to 22% of the global population, from 5% in 2009. That is an 
increase of nearly 1.3 billion smartphones in four years. 
In addition to its economic and social relevance, the smartphones application industry 
represents a major opportunity to study technology epiphanies. One of the main challenges 
for this research is to define the sample for the empirical research finding actual cases of 
technological epiphanies. Thus it’s necessary to find companies that after a major 
technological breakthrough, succeeded leveraging on technology epiphany strategy and not 
thanks to one or more of the other possible strategies presented in the literature review: i) 
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performance leadership, ii) cost leadership, iii) first-mover strategy, iv) complementary assets 
management and v) influence on regulations and standards. Choosing the smartphone app 
industry allows waving two of these strategies: complementary assets management and 
influence on regulations and standards (the remaining three strategies will be proved to be 
not significant in the two cases studies analyzed and compared within this industry). 
In the smartphone App industry all players share the same complementary assets (Teece, 
1986) and consequently they are invariant among different players. 
 Distribution 
App distribution is managed by the marketplaces (App Store and Google Play), which 
handle and distribute each App in the same way. 
 Complementary technologies 
Players in this industry share the same complementary technologies because all the 
Apps run on the same devices. Every App developer can leverage cameras, GPS 
antennas, compasses, Bluetooth etc. because these sensors are embedded in the 
device and accessible to every developer. 
 Services 
As with distribution, the marketplaces, which provide storage, manage the large 
majority of the relevant services in this industry centrally payment management, 
downloads, reviews, and ratings, in the same way for all players. 
 Competitive manufacturing 
In this software-based and virtual industry, these complementary assets are not 
relevant. 
Also in terms of influence on regulations and standards the smartphone App industry doesn't 
allow major differences among players. Rules are the same for each app in the category and 
standards related with contents, publication processes, technical aspects etc. are managed by 
marketplace owners and hardly influenced even by major players. 
Thanks to these characteristics, this industry allows us to focus our analysis on few of the 
strategies mentioned in the literature review: performance leadership, cost leadership, first-
mover strategy and, obviously, Technology Epiphanies. 
 
3.3. Case studies selection 
The smartphone App industry includes many different categories like games, finance, business 
etc. (currently the Apple App Store lists 24 categories). In order to achieve in depth knowledge 
and analysis we focused on a single one (Navigation) and we selected two case studies: Turn-
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by-Turn Navigation Applications and Marine Navigation Applications. The choice was made by 
looking for categories with clear market leaders, elevated number of players and recognized 
existing incumbents/meanings before the technological breakthrough. Moreover the 
navigation industry has been recently transformed by the new opportunities provided by a 
technological discontinuity: smartphone technologies. According to the McKinsey Global 
Institute (2011), ‘the use of real-time traffic information to inform navigation will create a 
quantifiable consumer surplus through savings on the time spent travelling and on fuel 
consumption. Mobile location-enabled applications will create surplus from consumers, too. 
In both cases, the surplus these innovations create is likely to far exceed the revenue 
generated by service providers ($100 billion+ revenue for service providers, Up to $700 billon 
value to users)’. 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
The case studies leveraged on secondary data retrieved throughout different sources: app 
stores (American Apple App Store and Google Play for general information, number of 
reviews, average rating and number of recommendations), official Facebook page of the app 
(number of likes), official website of the app (general information) and AppAnnie (release 
date). All data have been retrieved on April 3, 2014. In each industry, the success of the apps 
was outlined leveraging on users’ opinions. In order to understand the popularity of the apps 
the following data have been analyzed: number of recommendation on Google, likes on 
Facebook, reviews on app stores and average rating (stars) on App Stores. Then, we analyzed 
the cases using the same framework: 
 Competitive Context: both case studies start from the existence of market leaders 
before the technological discontinuity and from the evidence of the presence of 
current market leaders able to leverage the opportunities provided by smartphone 
technologies. Moreover, we prove in this section that none of the standard strategies 
to getting value from a technological discontinuity (performance leadership, cost 
leadership and first-mover strategy) can explain the current market structure; 
 Technology Epiphany: analyzing the applications that leverage smartphone 
opportunities, we explore and interpret their meaning; in other words, we 
differentiate those applications that show the same meaning supported by old 
applications from those able to propose new meanings.  
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 Implementation Actions: analyzing the applications that leverage smartphone 
opportunities, we analyze the implementation actions adopted by each of them in 
order to succeed. 
Thanks to this framework, we can compare the cases extrapolating the process they followed 
to implement a technology epiphany strategy. 
 
 
4. CASE 1: TURN-BY-TURN NAVIGATION APPLICATIONS 
 
4.1 Competitive Context  
Since the late '90s when GPS systems were first launched, the market has been dominated by 
Navigation Portable Devices (NPD). The market was practically a duopoly, with a market leader 
in USA (Garmin) and one in Europe (TomTom). Both of these companies are experiencing a 
dramatic drop in device sales. Garmin expects revenue from its personal navigation device 
unit to fall 10-15 percent in 20141. Similarly, TomTom’s forecast adjusted earnings per share 
in 2014 down 23 percent from 2013, reaching its lowest level since its stock market listing in 
20052. Navigation Portable Devices are being substituted with Apps running on smartphones. 
In 2013, for the first time, the number of active navigation App users overcame the installed 
base of NPDs. Forecasts says that the ratio in 2017 will be 4:13.  
This strong trend clearly shows that even if in the beginning users of NPDs and users of 
smartphone apps were possibly different in terms of navigation service needs (professional, 
reliable high frequency use for NPDs against more occasional use for smartphone apps), now 
this distinction is less and less true. Not surprisingly, indeed, Apple developed and launched 
in 2014 (in partnership with the main car manufacturers) the new Apple CarPlay service to 
fully integrate the iPhone in the car and replace the NPDs and OEM mapping services. Even if 
the two former market leaders entered the new App market quite soon and lowered the price 
of their offering (considering that they did not sell the device anymore), they lost their 
predominance anyway. When Google’s free map and navigation App became available for 
iPhones in December 2012, 10 million people downloaded it in just two days; Garmin sells 
almost the same amount of GPS devices in one year4. 
After the technological discontinuity, new market leaders appear to be Waze and Google 
Maps. Looking at Figure 2 (where the most popular apps in the market are compared), the 
                                                          
1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/19/garmin-results-idUSL3N0LO38R20140219 
2 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-tomtom-resultsidUSBREA1A0BJ20140211 
3 http://www.berginsight.com/ReportPDF/ProductSheet/bi-mns6-ps.pdf 
4 http://www.technologyreview.com/news/511786/a-shrinking-garmin-navigates-the-smartphone-storm/ 
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two apps lead the market in term of recommendations on Google Play, likes on Facebook, 
reviews on app stores and average rating (stars) on App Store. Google will not further been 
considered in the analysis because it is not a pure turn-by-turn navigation app and also 
because Google bought and integrated Waze back in 2013. We will focus on Waze instead, 
which is a pure navigation App, hence easier to be compared with other Apps and NPDs. 
Moreover, it represents an astonishing success case, as it was based on a community of 50+ 
million users in 2013 when Google decided to buy it for $1+ billion. 
 
 
Figure 2: Users’ evaluations of Turn-by-Turn Navigation Apps5 
 
Many new entrants approached the market after the technology discontinuity, leveraging on 
different strategies. As mentioned in the previous section, two strategies (managing 
complementary assets and influencing regulations and standards) cannot be considered in this 
field, because they are invariant among all the players. Table 2 compares the sample along 
the remaining strategies. 
 
                                                          
5 # of like on Facebook: if both the company and the specific app have a Facebook page we took the one with more likes, with 
the exception of Google Maps, where Google general page would have been highly influenced by other factors; Reviews on app 
stores: when the same app is both on Apple App Store and Google Play Store we picked the one with more reviews. 
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Table 2: Strategies in Turn-by-Turn apps 
 
According to Table 2 both incumbents (TomTom and Garmin) and some new entrants 
(NavFree, MapQuest, GPS Navigation) successfully implemented at least one strategy. Waze 
instead seems to not leverage on any of competitive drivers analyzed6. As a result none of the 
major strategies to getting value from new technologies seems to be able to explain the 
success of Waze against the competitors. The reason for Waze success has to be searched 
somewhere else: the new meaning proposed. 
 
4.2 Technology Epiphany: Waze 
Building on the work of Verganti (2009), we claim that the shift from Navigation Personal 
Devices to Navigation Apps on smartphones is mainly a technology substitution (see Figure 3). 
In addition to changing the device and adapting the technology, no breakthrough innovation 
was introduced. Nearly all the turn-by-turn Navigation Apps offered the same functions: i) 
driving you from one place to another following the best route according to specific limitations 
(no tolls, panoramic); and ii) calculating your ETA (expected time of arrival). 
 
                                                          
6 It is important to underline that Google Maps is not considered along the first-mover strategy, because their maps were used 
in a pre-installed app in the first five major iOS releases and initially it did not have a navigation feature. 
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Figure 3: Technology Substitution and Technology Epiphany in Turn-by-Turn Navigation 
Industry 
 
One remarkable exception is Waze, which was able to generate a real, new meaning for the 
industry. Waze is a company founded in 2008. The business idea was based on the creation of 
new maps thanks to the users; later, it changed into the current GPS-turn-by-turn navigator 
with a massive social component. 
 
“Get the best route, every day, with real–time help from other drivers.” 
(www.waze.com) 
 
Waze changed "why" people use a navigation service more than changing "how" they use it. 
Since the beginning of the industry, the main meaning of turn-by-turn navigation has been 
unchanged: to drive users from one place to another when they did not know the route. This 
meaning was the same for Navigation Personal Devices and for all the Navigation Apps we 
reviewed (TomTom, Garmin, NavFree, MapQuest, and Skobbler). This means that we do not 
use navigation while driving on a known route, which is probably the large majority of the 
time we spend driving. Waze completely changed this meaning. It was designed to be used 
also when we know exactly where to go. The traffic feature is a good example of this. Traffic 
conditions may affect the best route to travel to a familiar place. Waze is designed to collect 
information from all the wazers and to use them to adapt the route in real-time according to 
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the traffic conditions. The application is completely built on the concept of being useful for 
every drive. To achieve this new meaning, Waze did not leverage any particularly innovative 
technology. The whole technological environment provided by smartphones is the same for 
competitors. Still, Waze was able to unveil some ‘hidden’ opportunities already existing in 
those technologies. 
 
4.3 Implementation actions 
In order to make the new meaning actual, Waze had to implement different actions. First of 
all they developed a community and a whole set of new community based features to declare 
and reveal the new meaning to the customers: by-pass traffic, real time road alerts, and best 
gas prices. Waze is able to extract as much value as possible from the community because it 
has designed an effective collaboration process which allows everyone to contribute 
according to their will and their sense of belonging to the community. 
Let us consider, for example, Waze's maps and traffic services. Every Wazer is contributing to 
them simply by turning the application on and driving. GPS data will tell the company when 
new roads are created or when Wazers are stuck in a traffic jam. A second level of 
collaboration is more active, as Wazers can report road closings, works, car crashes, and police 
patrols by clicking on the App (the entry will be automatically geolocalized). This information 
will be used both to update the maps and to change the routes of upcoming Wazers to help 
them avoid the same traffic jams. Finally, the community can also decide to actively work on 
maps by changing them or accepting/refusing changes proposed by other members (the 
contribution process prevents hazardous behaviors, letting the user change only those routes 
he/she drove through). 
After introducing these features, which dramatically expanded the usage of the navigator, 
making it useful even when driving on known routes, Waze leveraged the community concept 
even more by introducing more personalized social functions: ‘driving is not just for getting 
yourself for one point to another; much of the time you spend on the road you are on the way 
to meet up with friends, pick up family or doing co-workers’7. For example, they now provide 
services to' receive pick-up requests from friends. Waze will drive you to the pick-up place and 
provide your friends with your live-updated ETA to be sure you meet at the right time. It is 
relevant to note that all these features imply to be continuously connected to Waze servers. 
Thus, users who don’t have good data reception in areas that they usually drive in, or who just 
don’t want to surpass their limited data plan quota might perceive a trade-off between these 
                                                          
7 www.youtube.com/watch?v=1KCYEMkpZ1k 
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aspects and the benefits offered by Waze. Nevertheless, 50+ million Wazers appear to be 
happy to contribute to the community, as they see the results of their (small) efforts. In other 
words, Waze was able to find the community and the community’s dynamics within the 
smartphone technology. 
In order to pursue the technology epiphany strategy Waze had to modify the dominant 
business model in turn-by-turn navigation industry. Nearly all companies selling Navigation 
Personal Devices used to share the same business model: provision of both the hardware (GPS 
antenna, screen, speaker...) and the maps (including the updating service). Smartphones 
significantly changed this competitive environment, as the hardware is now designed and sold 
by third parties (mobile manufacturers). Companies such as TomTom and Garmin, as well as 
new entrant Apps providers (MapQuest, NavFree), approached this new environment with a 
similar business model, selling the applications in the App stores (e.g., Apple Store and Google 
Play) and/or using the in-App purchases to provide users with premium services or updated 
maps. Waze approached the market with a completely different business model: the App is 
available for free. The value of the App is related to the network externality (the bigger the 
community, the better the service) and is embedded in the continuous improvement of the 
maps. Using the typical business model for App providers, the income flows are related to 
advertising8. Instead of polluting the application with banners, though, Waze provides the 
opportunity to buy location based ads inside the maps, publicizing businesses when customers 
are near to the point of sale (e.g. when they are stopped at a nearby traffic light). Users 
perceive this non-invasive marketing strategy as a service. 
Finally, in terms of development processes, the technological switch from stand-alone devices 
to smartphones dramatically impacted the market. The NPDs' traditional business was based 
on an approximately one-year product lifecycle. The main market players still update their 
maps quarterly. The smartphone App market is completely different. Speed is one of the most 
important competitive factors. Waze maps are updated daily and both Waze and Google Maps 
do not store whole maps on the phone but always enable the download of portions of a map 
from the internet when needed. In this way, a map update is delivered on the next download. 
Speed is not solely a matter of content, however. NPDs were launched on the market on a 
yearly basis, and main innovations were embedded into them with the same frequency. 
Smartphone applications have a much faster release frequency. It is interesting to note that 
the Apps by TomTom and Garmin show no relevant differences regarding the innovation 
speed when compared with native smartphones applications. In Figure 4, it is possible to 
                                                          
8 https://biz.world.waze.com 
 24 
appreciate these similarities by looking at the average frequency of releases since each 
application’s first publication (data regarding dates and contents of each single release have 
been retrieved from Apple App Store and AppAnnie on April 3, 2014). To allow a deeper 
analysis, we first compared the general release frequency (any release is counted), and then 
we eliminated the releases that included only bug fixing and divided the remaining releases 
into improvement releases (e.g., improvement of existing features) and main improvement 
releases (e.g., complete new features or App redesign). Four researchers did independently 
the release coding by classifying every release along the app history, then data have been 
compared and averaged. No major differences are detectable among different players. 
Garmin appears to be considerably faster than others, but we must also report that no main 
improvements have been introduced since Q4 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4: Release Frequency for Turn-by-Turn Navigation Apps 
 
Finally, we can say that in order to implement the new meaning and get full advantage from 
the technology epiphany strategy Waze had to i) develop a full set of features leveraging on 
the community, ii) challenge and adapt the dominant business model in the industry and iii) 
challenge and adapt the dominant development processes and practices in the industry. 
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The market started at the end of the '80s with companies such as Garmin, Raymarine, and 
Navman integrating GPS sensors into their chart plotters. Since the early stages of the 
industry, the dominant business model was based on the separation between hardware and 
content providers. On one hand, companies such as Raymarine, Navman, Lowrance, and 
Hummingbird design and manufacture the chart-plotters. On the other hand, companies such 
as Navionics and C-Map (now Jeppesen, a Boeing company) produce digital maritime 
cartographies that can be mounted on different devices. Garmin represented an exception to 
this model as its devices used proprietary charts for a long time. Unlike the turn-by-turn 
navigation industry, the marine navigation industry has not been completely revolutionized 
yet by the new smartphone/tablet technology. Chart-plotter manufacturers continue to lead 
the market, probably because their devices have a more reliable GPS fixing and are integrated 
with many other boat safety-critical devices such as sonars and radars. Nonetheless, the 
technological breakthrough has started. iNavx proposed the first marine navigation app (Aug, 
2008), then several new entrants (Charts&Tides, Marine Navigation Lite, SeaNav, 
Openseamap) and incumbents charts provider (Navionics, Jeppesen and Garmin) proposed 
their apps as well. 
Looking at Figure 5 (where the most popular apps in the market are compared) iNavx leads 
the market in term of reviews on the Apple store, but its average rating is similar to others. 
Considering the entire set of indicators, Navionics seems to be widely the most appreciated. 
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Figure 5: Users’ evaluations of Marine Navigation Apps 
 
As in in turn-by-turn competitive context, also marine navigation players approached market 
with different strategies. Table 3 shows the best adopter(s) for each strategy. 
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According to Table 3 both incumbents (Navionics, Jeppsen and Garmin) and new entrants 
(SeaNav, Charts & tides, iNavx, Marine Navigation) successfully implemented at least one 
strategy. As a consequence Navionics success cannot be explained with traditional strategies 
because at least one competitor could be considered at par or better on each strategy. As in 
the previous case a technology epiphany is instead the key difference between Navionics and 
the competitors. 
 
5.2 Technology Epiphany: Navionics 
Building once again on Verganti (2009) we claim that the shift from chart-plotters to marine 
Apps on smartphones and tablets is mainly a technology substitution (see Figure 6). In addition 
to changing the device and adapting the technology, no breakthrough innovation was 
introduced. The Apps are cheaper but difficult to use and appear not to be able to fully 
compete with the traditional chart-plotters, because smartphones and tablets have less 
powerful antennas, depend on less durable batteries, and are not waterproof. Obviously it is 
possible to overcome these downsides using add-ons components, but the result is expensive 
and still not comparable with traditional chart-plotters. Navionics represents the only 
exception to this as they fully understood that boaters and sailors can use the App before and 
after the sea journey. They changed the why people use the App. 
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Figure 6: Technology substitution and Technology epiphany in Marine Navigation Industry 
 
Since the beginning of the industry the main meaning of marine navigation has been 
unchanged; it was a tool to safely assist users while boating or sailing. This means that marine 
navigation systems were mainly used while actually boating and, even more precisely, when 
boating in specific areas (e.g., along the coast) or doing specific activities (e.g., following a 
route). This was the meaning for chart-plotters and does not seem to have changed in the 
marine navigation App we reviewed (Marine Navigation Lite, Charts&Tides, SeaNav, iNavX, 
Openseamap, Jeppesen Plan2Nav, and Garmin Bluechart). Navionics changed this meaning by 
transforming the App into a tool to be used also before and after the nautical activity. The 
application is not meant to be a technological substitute for the traditional chart-plotter, but 
a complementary experience providing pre- and post-services to users. It even syncs with 
plotters to transfer markers and routes to the plotter at the beginning of the nautical activity 
and from the plotter at the end9. 
Navionics did not leverage any particular new technology to achieve this change in meaning. 
They share with competitors all the hardware and software opportunities provided by 
smartphones and tablets. Nonetheless, they were able to see, before others, some ‘hidden’ 
opportunities already existing in those technologies. 
                                                          
9 http://www.navionics.com/en/mobile-pc-app 
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5.3 Implementation Actions 
In order to make the new meaning actual, Navionics had to implement different actions. First 
of all they developed a community and a full set of features leveraging on it. The App, offers 
basic planning features as tracks or distances and advanced planning features such as auto-
routing, fishing modes, seabed composition and depth shading. Moreover, the community of 
boaters is heavily involved, providing fuel prices, personal experiences, updates of the marine 
POI database and geolocalized data to correct map errors. In this way the community 
constantly updates services and charts, and their quality is very much higher than before. For 
example, the Costa Concordia wreck was marked in just five hours; in the traditional business, 
nearly one year would have been necessary10. Navionics' App extends far beyond chart-
plotters, providing a full experience: planning, boating, and reviewing nautical activity. 
In order to pursue the technology epiphany Navionics had to modify the dominant business 
model. Unlike the turn-by-turn navigation industry, the marine industry had a business model 
in which hardware (plotters) and contents (charts) were not provided by a single company11. 
Companies such as Navionics and Jeppesen focused their efforts on improving the quality of 
their maps in terms of details, coverage and precision. They did so by digitalizing map-related 
data and adding new information they generated through advanced remote sensing. Other 
companies (e.g., Raymarine, Navman, Lowrance, and Hummingbird) provided the hardware 
and the services for the final user. When smartphones and SDKs were released, Navionics 
attempted to replicate the business model by seeking third parties able to develop Apps 
delivering nautical services, with the intent of providing maps to the third parties as they did 
for the chart-plotters manufacturers. Navionics realized immediately that such providers were 
not on the market yet, thus they had to decide whether to wait for them or to drive the change 
in the market12. Navionics took the second option, switching their business model from map 
developers to nautical service developers. At the beginning, they provided different Apps 
according to the maps (e.g., US and Europe). The selling price was considerably lower than the 
one Navionics charged for traditional chart-plotter maps, as they understood that the market 
was not ready for very expensive Apps. Recently, Navionics realized that the App should be 
provided for free, allowing users to customize it through in-App purchases, in terms of maps 
but also in terms of services (e.g., auto-routing and sonar charts). 
                                                          
10 Navionics CEO interview on March 13, 2014. 
11 As previously reported, Garmin previously integrated the two layers but recently modified their chart-plotters’ design to work 
with Navionics and Jeppesen map. 
12 Navionics CEO interview on March 13, 2014. 
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The traditional marine navigator business was a seasonal one, linked to the fall nautical trade 
fairs where companies presented their new products. The seasonal business of chart-plotter 
manufacturers obviously influenced their providers markets and the map market was no 
exception, being seasonal as well. As explained in the turn-by-turn navigation case, the 
innovation speed in smartphones and tablet environments is a lot faster; instead of being 
yearly based, it is weekly based. For this reason, the ‘waterfall’ development model formerly 
used was no longer suitable, and Navionics had to change the development system speed to 
support its innovation in meaning. In Figure 7, it is possible to compare the average frequency 
of release of the different apps since the their first publication. To allow a deeper analysis, we 
first compared the general release frequency (any release is counted), then eliminated the 
releases that included only bug fixing and divided the remaining releases between 
improvement (e.g., improvement of existing features) and main improvement releases (e.g., 
complete new features or App redesign). Four researchers did independently the release 
coding, by classifying every release along the app history; data have been compared and 
averaged. No major differences are detectable among different players. 
 
 
Figure 7: Release Frequency for Marine Navigation Apps 
 
Finally, we can say that in order to implement the new meaning and get full advantage from 
the technology epiphany strategy Navionics had to i) develop a full set of features leveraging 
on the community, ii) challenge and adapt the dominant business model in the industry and 
iii) challenge and adapt the dominant development processes and practices in the industry. 
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6. CASE STUDIES COMPARISON 
Before comparing the data derived from the two case studies, it is important to underline how 
very different Navionics and Waze are. On the one hand, they share the same industry (Apps 
for smartphones/tablets) and even the same category (navigation); on the other hand, they 
differ in nearly all the other contingent variables. Waze is a start-up with no connections with 
companies in the turn-by-turn navigation market. Conversely, Navionics was a leader in the 
nautical map industry, which means they had a powerful brand (connected to the old 
meaning) and an incumbent position, which could allow them to be unprofitable at the 
beginning because they could finance the new initiative with the old, stable, and rentable 
market. Moreover, their competitive environments are very different. Turn-by-turn 
navigation systems are a quasi-commodity; almost everyone has one. The same cannot be 
said for marine navigation systems. Boats are definitely not a commodity and, even among 
boaters, these are a niche product still not affordable by everyone. In addition, the importance 
of map quality and competitive pressure is very different. Marine navigation maps are much 
more safety-critical than street maps. No one likes to have a missing road on the turn-by-turn 
navigation device, but, doubtless, finding a missing rock near the coast is another level of 
problem entirely. As a consequence, the importance of map quality acts as an entry barrier in 
the marine navigation business. Good and reliable maps crossing multiple data sources are a 
difficult asset to build. 
Considering all these differences, it is even more surprising to note how the two companies 
adopted a similar managerial process to successfully implement their Technology Epiphany 
strategy (see Table 4). 
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 Value appropriated: selling maps + 
advanced functionalities (in-App 
purchasing) 
Adapt the development 
processes to the new 
environment  
New models almost every year 
 
Maps updated quarterly 
 Speed 
 High frequency releases (both maps 
and functionalities) 
 Agile development 
New models every year presented at 
trade fairs 
Maps updated quarterly 
 Speed 
 High frequency releases (both maps 
and functionalities) 
 Agile development 
Table 4: Comparison between Waze and Navionics case studies 
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By comparing the two cases, it is possible to note how they changed ‘why’ people utilize their 
application by going through a similar sequence of steps. 
First of all, both Waze and Navionics were able to "interpret" the smartphone not as a 
standard navigation tool (NPD or chart-plotter), but as a technology connected to the Internet 
and thus, natively enabling community-based services. Retrospectively, this might seem 
obvious; it is enough to check the App Store, and one discovers that many of the most widely 
distributed Apps are community-based and social (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, etc.). 
Nonetheless, they were able to unveil this opportunity hidden in the technology before any 
other competitor in their industry. 
Once the opportunity was detected, it was translated into a New Meaning. In the Waze case, 
the New Meaning was conceptualized as "Get the best route, every day, with real–time help 
from other drivers" against the old one dominating in the industry: "Drive the users to 
unknown places". Similarly in the Navionics case study, the New Meaning "Provide full support 
to boaters by offering not only maps but also community-based services before, during, and 
after the nautical activity" was conceptualized against the dominant one in the industry: 
"Assist the users during navigation by providing detailed maps data". 
Both cases are then characterized by the development of new features able to reveal the New 
Meaning to the customers. In the Waze case study, we see the introduction of many 
functionalities leveraging the community and the real time bidirectional interconnection 
between its members and a central server: bypass traffic, instant road alerts, gas prices, etc. 
Similarly in the Navionics case study, new features leveraging the Internet connection and the 
community were introduced: crowdsourcing, marine POI, stories and photo sharing, etc. 
It is interesting to note that in both case studies, the Technology Epiphanies requested the 
adaption of the Business Model and the Development Process to the new environment and 
that these adaptations appear to be very similar in the two case studies. In terms of business 
models, Waze and Navionics employ an already existing and widely distributed hardware 
(smartphones and tablets), distribute the app for free and generate value through community-
based features. Only in terms of value appropriation are the two case studies different: 
Navionics sell its content, whereas Waze leverages on advertising. However, considering the 
importance of map quality in the navigation industry (which means a lower number of 
comparable offers) and the very high price of the traditional solution (Chart-plotter + Maps), 
it is easy to understand why customers are willing to pay a medium-high price for Navionics' 
services.  
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In addition, the two case studies demonstrate interesting similarities also in terms of 
development processes. Both cases exhibit superior development performances if compared 
with the traditional businesses. Marine and Turn-by-Turn traditional companies previously 
would release new products annually. On the contrary, new versions of the Apps are released 
every two weeks on average; they encompass significant improvements to existing 
functionalities quarterly and are completely revolutionized more than once a year. This 
development speed is even greater considering the maps: in the Waze case, they are updated 
daily. These performances are clear indicators of some agile development methodology 
typical of the smartphone app industry. 
 
 
7. DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Many academics focused so far on how to obtain value from a technological discontinuity. 
Many of the strategies proposed until now (like performance leadership, cost leadership, first-
mover strategy, complementary assets management, influence on regulations and standards) 
have been studied in depth by previous research both in terms of definition and in terms of 
managerial practices to be implemented to pursue them. 
By carefully design the research process and the case studies selection, we could find 
incredibly successful cases in which the effect of the abovementioned strategies could be 
considered negligible. Even if the adopted case study approach does not allow one to draw 
normative conclusions, the analysis of the collected data suggests that in competitive 
environments in which complementary assets and regulations/standards are not 
differentiating among players, the ability to develop Technology Epiphanies appears to 
outperform all other possible strategies such as performance leadership, cost leadership and 
first-moving strategies. Other researchers already focused on innovations able to suddenly 
annihilate incumbent companies and completely reshape the competitive environments (e.g., 
digital imaging and the film industry, or Amazon and booksellers). Downes and Nunes (2013) 
call them Big-Bang Disruptions and note that they appear to disobey the well-established 
strategic rules for innovation, ‘Big-bang disrupters [...] are thoroughly un-disciplined. They 
start life with better performance at a lower price and greater customization. They compete 
with mainstream products on all three value disciplines right from the start’ (p.8). Moreover, 
Big-Bang Innovations do not appear to respect the ‘Rogers’s classic bell curve of five distinct 
customer segments—innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards’ 
 35 
(p.6), as they immediately target all segments of users. Finally, they seek innovation through 
rapid-fire, low-cost experimentation on popular platforms. 
Our case studies perfectly fit this description. 
Downes and Nunes recognize that the base for these innovations is not rooted in technology: 
‘in the future, the most successful innovators may be those who simply happen upon the right 
combination of other people’s technologies’ (p. 6). We claim that 'simply happen' must be 
somehow projectable. A possible way to achieve Big-Bang Disruptive innovations is to seek a 
Technology Epiphany. Unfortunately, though, this research field is still largely unexplored, as 
the phenomenon was identified and described in previous literature but no research has tried 
so far to shed some light on what process companies could employ to pursue a Technology 
Epiphany strategy. This article contributes in moving forward the boundaries of knowledge 
extracting a 5-step process from the two Technology Epiphany cases analysed (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: 5-steps process to implement Technology Epiphany strategies 
 
The success in implementing a Technology Epiphany strategy appears to be connected to the 
following managerial steps: 
Step 1: Unveiling Opportunities hidden in the technology 
The first step is to understand what opportunities the technology provides. Looking at the 
technology in terms of existing features and performances will inevitably lead to a simple 
technology substitution (as in the case of TomTom) or to screen it off as not useful (as in the 
case of the Swiss manufacturers with the quartz mechanisms). Technologies have many 
hidden potential opportunities within them, and the first step is to make them appear (Proni, 
2007). This first crucial step is very difficult and not surprisingly, it occurs sometime after the 
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technological discontinuity. This dynamic is coherent with Abernathy and Utterback (1978) or 
Tushman and Anderson (1990): Technology Epiphanies do not come at the beginning of the 
ferment era. On the contrary, they come after a while and, retrospectively, they appear to 
have always been clearly written in the technology itself. Smartphones, unlikely chart plotters 
and Navigation Portable Devices, are communication tools (a telephone, a texter and an email 
client), and many of the top rated apps are social and community-based. It should be no 
surprise that smartphones provide the opportunity to leverage a community, as it should not 
be a surprise that LCDs brought calculators, meters and games into wristwatches. It is always 
easy to connect the dots backward. 
Step2: Translate the opportunity into a New Meaning  
The second step is to translate the opportunity into a New Meaning for the target industry. 
This second step requires, first of all, extensive knowledge of the market and of the current 
dominant meaning. It is not possible to assess the New Meaning as better or worse in 
comparison to the previous one; it is simply different (Verganti, 2009). Being significantly 
different, it requires new measures that cannot be compared with the previous one. 
Elaborating the new proposal on the “why” dimension instead of the “how” one, the New 
Meaning defines a new strategic direction to the point that sometimes, it can have the shape 
of a company mission as in the case of Waze: "provide the best route, every day, with real–
time help from other drivers". 
Step 3: Develop new features to reveal the New Meaning  
The New Meaning creates no value if it remains potential. To make it actual, it is necessary to 
reveal it to customers through a whole set of features. These revealing features are all 
different ways to implement the meaning; each of them must be clearly and unequivocally 
connected to the New Meaning. For example, in the Waze case study, such features are bypass 
traffic (based on users), instant road alerts, meet-up, and maps editing, etc. 
Steps 4 & 5: Adapt the business model and the development process to the new environment 
The last two steps appear to be a needed but not sufficient prerequisite to pursue Technology 
Epiphanies. In an environment shaken by a technological discontinuity, the previous business 
models and development processes will hardly still be effective. Designing games for the 
Nintendo Wii must have required radical changes to the dominant developing process as well 
as the business models of quartz based watches being different form the traditional Swiss 
watch ones: quartz watches were not supposed to last forever. Similarly, both Waze and 
Navionics challenged the dominant business model in the industry (the apps are for free) as 
well as the development process (maps are now updated daily or weekly instead of quarterly 
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or yearly). Comparing Waze and Navionics to their competitors, however, it is easy to see that 
many of them share similar business models and development strategies. These two 
managerial practices appear to be necessary enablers for developing a Technology Epiphany, 
but clearly not sufficient to effectively implement this strategy. 
 
 
8. LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE EVOLUTIONS 
The investigation leaves some relevant gaps. First, the sample is composed of only two case 
studies, and the exploratory nature of the research suggests the application of a literal 
replication in selecting them. On the one hand, more similar cases should be added to increase 
the internal validity of the results. On the other hand, it would be interesting to add new cases 
from outside navigation systems and perhaps, from outside the App industry, to increase the 
external validity as well. In terms of depth of the analysis, it would be very interesting to switch 
from secondary sources to primary sources, illuminating the internal organization of the 
analysed companies to provide an answer to some of the following questions: Is the 
probability for introducing Technology Epiphanies dependent on the internal skills of the 
development team? Is there a relationship between the development process and Technology 
Epiphanies? Are there other cases of Technology Epiphanies introduced by incumbent firms? 
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